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is a disturbing indication of its desire to construe the CPLR narrowly 31 and to sanction such a restrictive approach by the lower

courts.
Jane M. Knight

CIvIL

RIGHTS LAW

Civ. Rights Law § 51: An infant may not disaffirm prior parental
consent to the commercial publication of her photograph
Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law 2 establish the right of any living person to prevent the nonconsensual
commercial exploitation of his or her name or likeness.33 The proDiv. 2d 772, 772, 296 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (3d Dep't 1969); see also In re Berent, 86 App. Div.
2d 764, 766, 448 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (4th Dep't 1982) (section 675 of the Insurance Law held
controlling).
Section 3394 of the Public Health Law, the statute at issue in Fiedelman, provides that
review must be made "within sixty days after service of the order" of the Commissioner.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3394(2) (McKinney 1977). There is no mention of the type of
service to be made. See id. It is submitted that the lack of specificity of this statute distinguishes Fiedelman from other decisions holding CPLR 2103 inapplicable to administrative
proceedings. Moreover, in light of the lack of clarity in the Public Health Law, it is suggested that consistency with the purposes of the CPLR and administrative law militates in
favor of granting a petitioner the benefit of the time extension.
31The narrow construction contravenes the CPLR's mandate to construe provisions liberally. See CPLR 104 (1972).
32 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). Section 50 of the Civil Rights Law
provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her
parent or guardian, is guility of a misdemeanor.
Id. § 50.
Civil remedies for invasion of privacy are provided for in section 51 of the Civil Rights
Law:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action . . . against the
person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and
restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used
such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared
to be unlawful by section fifty... the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
Id. § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
33 A common-law right of privacy was rejected in New York in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902). See Kiss v. County of Putnam,
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tection afforded by these statutes extends only to persons who
have not consented in writing to such utilization.34 In the case of a
minor, permission may be obtained through a parent or legal
59 App. Div. 2d 773, 773, 398 N.Y.S.2d 729, 729 (2d Dep't 1977); Blair v. Union Free School
Dist. No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
In Roberson, a manufacturer printed and distributed 25,000 copies of an advertisement
containing a girl's picture which had been appropriated without her consent. 171 N.Y. at
542, 64 N.E. at 442. Alleging both physical and mental "distress" due to the unsolicited
commercialization of her photograph, the young woman sought an injunction. Id. at 542-43,
64 N.E. at 442. The Court of Appeals denied her relief, holding that "the so-called 'right of
privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the
doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by
which the profession and the public have long been guided." Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
In direct response to Roberson the legislature created a right to privacy in New York by
statute. Ch. 132, § 1 [1903] N.Y. Laws 308; see Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d
433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 787
(1983); Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975,
978 (1959); S. HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK 11-12
(1954); W. ZELERMYER, INVASION OF PRIVACY 41 (1959); Greenawalt, New York's Right to
Privacy-The Need for Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 159, 161 (1975); supra note 32. If,
however, an individual is deemed to be a public figure or is involved in a newsworthy event,
his statutory protections are abrogated. See, e.g., Bass v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 59
App. Div. 2d 684, 685, 398 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (1st Dep't 1977); Rosemont Enters. v. Random
House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128-29 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968), affd
mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1969); see also Namath v. Sports
Illustrated, 48 App. Div. 2d 487, 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1st Dep't 1975) (incidental utilization of photograph in commercial advertising not prohibited), af'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352
N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
Since these statutes create a right that was not known at common law and contain
penal sanctions, they have been construed narrowly. See, e.g., McGraw v. Watkins, 49 App.
Div. 2d 958, 959, 373 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (3d Dep't 1975); Callas v. Whisper, Inc., 198 Misc.
829, 831, 101 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Kings County 1950), aff'd, 278 App. Div.
974, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (2d Dep't 1951), afl'd, 303 N.Y. 759, 103 N.E.2d 543 (1952). In McGraw, the plaintiff alleged that she had validly rescinded a release on a nude film that the
defendant had taken of her and that he intended to display at the Cannes Film Festival 49
App. Div. 2d at 958-59, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 664. The Third Department dismissed her complaint because the plaintiff had failed to allege any commercial exploitation of the movie.
Id. at 959, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The strict interpretation and conservative application of
these statutes have generated much criticism. See S. HOFSTADTRE, supra, at 44; M. MAYER,
RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 173-74 (1972); Greenawalt, supra, at 169-88.
11 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); Schneiderman v. New York Post Corp.,
31 Misc. 2d 697, 698, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Kings County 1961) (citing
Hammond v. Crowell Publishing Co., 253 App. Div. 205, 206, 1 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (1st Dep't
1938)); see also Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y.)
("New York courts have always applied the requirements of written consent strictly"), rev'd
on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968); Lomax v. New Broadcasting Co., 18 App. Div.
2d 229, 229, 238 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (1st Dep't 1963) (estoppel or oral consent will not satisfy
statutory requirements but merely mitigate damages); Selsman v. Universal Photo Books,
Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 151, 152-53, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687-88 (1st Dep't 1963) (commercial use
of name or photograph without written authorization violative of statute).
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guardian.3 5 In such a situation, however, the qualified right of a
minor to disaffirm contracts is implicated.38 Recently, in Shields v.
36 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); see supra note 32; see also Buscelle v.
Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 173 Misc. 674, 674, 19 N.Y.S.2d 129, 129-30 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
T. N.Y. County 1940) (oral parental consent is partial defense); Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 Misc. 551, 552, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (N.Y.C. City Ct. Queens County 1938)
(publication of infant photographs requires parental consent).
36 See Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 8, 15, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580,
589 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957), modified on other grounds, 6 App. Div. 2d 223,
229, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587, 593 (2d Dep't 1958), modified, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185
N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959); Goldfinger v. Doherty, 153 Misc. 826, 828, 276 N.Y.S. 289, 292-93 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 244 App. Div. 779, 280 N.Y.S. 778 (1st Dep't 1935);
see also Lustig v. Schoonover, 51 N.Y.S.2d 156, 156-57 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (generally no liability on infant after disaffirmance of contract), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 830, 56
N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1945).
The ability of an infant to avoid contractual responsibilities was established early at
common law. See 2 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 223, at 2 (W. Jaeger 3d ed.
1957). This concept was recognized in the United States in the 19th century. See Note,
Infant Contracts-BeneficialAspect, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 257, 257-58 (1965). Under New York
law, an infant's contracts are not void, but voidable. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F.
Supp. 1222, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 245,
247, 188 N.E. 726, 726-27 (1934); Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N.Y. 201, 211 (1884); In re
Yonnone, 72 Misc. 2d 579, 580, 339 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (Sur. Ct. Orange County 1972); Fisher
v. Cattani, 53 Misc. 2d 221, 222, 278 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966); L.
MAYERS, LAW OF BUSINESS CoNTRAcTs § 163, at 104 (1939). The voidability concept emerged
in response to the desire to protect a minor from his lack of commercial acumen and to
prevent the business community from capitalizing on a child's naivete. See, e.g., Green v.
Green, 69 N.Y. 553, 556-57 (1877); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stotsky, 60 Misc. 2d
451, 455, 303 N.Y.S.2d 463, 468 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Suffolk County 1969); Whitmarsh v. Hall,
3 Denio 375, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1846); Wilcox, Legal Rights of Children, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 9-10 (1974); R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 681-83 (1978); Edge,
Voidability of Minors' Contracts:A FeudalDoctrine in a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV.
205, 205 (1967); Note, Infant's Disaffirmance of a Contract:Methods of Handling the Resulting Injustice, 43 N.D.L. REV. 89, 89 (1966-1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Infant's
Disaffirmance].
A minor's right of disaffirmance is not applicable to contracts for "necessaries," thus
making the right a qualified one. E.g., CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fisher v. Cattani, 53 Misc. 2d 221, 223, 278 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1966); see 2 S. WILLISTON, supra, § 240, at 49 ("infant may make himself
liable for goods that are necessary, considering his position and station in life"). The ability
to disaffirm has been abrogated further by statutory enactments. See, e.g., GOL § 3-101(1)
(1978) (contracts may not be disaffirmed on ground of infancy after age 18); see id. § 3-103
(infants eligible for G.I. Bill loans may not disaffirm); see also id. § 3-105(1) (performing
arts and sports contracts with minors are unavoidable if judicial approval is granted); N.Y.
JuD. LAW § 474 (McKinney 1983) (judicial approval of attorney's fees on award to infant).
See generally Current Legislation, Enforceabilityof Business Contracts of Minors Eighteen
Years and Over, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 154, 154-60 (1941). A minor may not exercise the
right of disaffirmance if such action would result in receiving a windfall. E.g., Casey v. Kastel, 237 N.Y. 305, 314-15, 142 N.E. 671, 674-75 (1924); Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 583, 55
N.E. 275, 276 (1899). The Rice Court concluded that while a minor could disaffirm an installment contract and return the merchandise, she would be liable for its depreciation. 160
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Gross,s" the Court of Appeals held that the privilege of a minor to
disaffirm a contract was abrogated in agreements pertaining to the
republication of photographs of a minor where an unrestricted consent of the parent or guardian had been obtained."
In Shields, the plaintiff, at age 10, had posed for a series of
nude photographs. 9 Two releases had been executed by her
mother before the pictures were taken.40 For a number of years the
photographs were reproduced in various publications and utilized
by the photographer at his discretion. 4' Disturbed over the type of
magazines in which the pictures might appear, and unsuccessful in
her attempt to purchase the negatives, the 16-year-old plaintiff,
now a world-renowned model and actress, initiated a suit to enjoin
further commercial use of the pictures by the defendant-photograN.Y. at 583, 55 N.E. at 276. In that case, "she would be making use of the privilege of
infancy as a sword, and not as a shield." Id. The ability of infants to profit from their power
of rescission, thereby causing a loss of profits and unstable and untrustworthy business relations, has been the source of the vast majority of criticism concerning this doctrine. See
infra note 63.
37 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1983).
38 Id. at 341, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
"
See id. at 341-42, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The plaintiff was shown
nude in a bathtub scene for a pictorial financed by Playboy Press. Id. This was one of a
series of modeling assignments arranged by the Ford Model Agency, in which the plaintiff
was photographed by the respondent. Id. at 341, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
10 Id. at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The consent form executed by the
plaintiff's mother stated, in part:
I hereby give the photographer, his legal representatives, and assigns, those
for whom the photographer is acting, and those acting with his permission, or his
employees, the right and permission to copyright and/or use, reuse and/or publish,
and republish photographic pictures or portraits of me, or in which I may be distorted in character, or form, in conjunction with my own or a fictitious name, on
reproductions thereof in color, or black and white made through any media by the
photographer at his studio or elsewhere, for any purpose whatsoever; including the
use of any printed matter in conjunction therewith.
I hereby waive any right to inspect or approve the finished photograph or
advertising copy or printed matter that may be used in conjunction therewith or
to the eventual use that it might be applied.
Id. at 342 n.*, 448 N.E.2d at 109 n.*, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255 n.*.
The infant-plaintiff's signature on a similar form was deemed by the trial court to have
no effect. Shields v. Gross, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
The plaintiff's mother admitted that she had not read the "voucher-release form" before she
signed it, nor had she discussed the form with the defendant. Id.
41 58 N.Y.2d at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The photographs were
reprinted in magazines and reproduced in an enlargement which was displayed in a New
York City store window. Id. Both the plaintiff and her mother were aware of the use of the
photographs and, in fact, subsequently obtained the defendant's consent to publish the pictures in the plaintiff's own book. Id.
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pher. 42 The plaintiff, asserting a common-law right to disaffirm a
contract entered into during her infancy, contended that revocation of her legal guardian's consent triggered the statutory proscriptions of section 51 of the Civil Rights Law. 3 The trial court,
after an initial determination that the contract was not for the production of pornography," and thus not violative of public policy,
deemed the executed releases to be valid and binding on the plaintiff.45 Although the complaint was ultimately dismissed, the court
granted, on the defendant's stipulation, an injunction prohibiting
the sale of the prints to pornographic publications. 6 On appeal the
Appellate Division, First Department, found that the Civil Rights
Law does not limit the common-law privilege of an infant to disaffirm and modified the judgment by extending the scope of the injunction to include any commercial utilization of the
photographs.4 7
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals further modified the
injunction by eliminating the trade restrictions added by the Appellate Division. 48 Writing for the majority, 49 Judge Simons observed initially that while an infant enjoys a common-law right to
disaffirm contractual liabilities, this privilege can be circumscribed
42

See id. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive

relief. Id.
43 See id. at 341, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51
(McKinney 1976).
44 See Shields v. Gross, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 13, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1981).
45 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 109-10, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
46 Id. Special Term held that section 51 abrogated infant disaffirmance, ordered a preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for a determination on the validity and scope of
the releases. Id. at 342-43, 448 N.E.2d at 109-10, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56. On remand, the
trial court, sitting without a jury, determined that no limitations had been placed on the
releases. Id., 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
'7 Id.
at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256. Presiding Justice Kupferman
concurred, along with Justices Sandler and Silverman, confirming the plaintiff's commonlaw privilege, as an infant, to rescind a parental consent. 88 App. Div. 2d 846, 847-48, 451
N.Y.S.2d 420, 419-21 (1st Dep't 1982). Justice Kupferman, in a separate concurrence, stated
that GOL § 3-105 was applicable in this situation. 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 256; see GOL § 3-105 (1978). Justice Asch concurred in a separate opinion,
determining that the consents were unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under sections 2-102 and 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at
110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256; see N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-302 (McKinney 1964). Justice Carro, in
the lone dissent, agreed with the trial court's judgment. 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 110,
461 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
48 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
"' Judge Simons was joined in his opinion by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Wachtler
and Jones. Judges Meyer and Fuchsberg joined in Judge Jasen's dissent.
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by legislative proscription."0 By enacting a statute which attaches
legal significance to a parent's authorization of a minor's contract,
the majority reasoned, the legislature must have intended contracts of this kind to be enforceable.5 1 Strictly construing Civil
Rights Law section 51, the Court held that a guardian's consent is
binding on the minor, and thus, irrevocable.52 Moreover, the Court
concluded that in light of the need for contractual stability in the
modelling industry, 3 it is the parent's or guardian's responsibility
to limit the scope of consent so that the best interests of the infant
may be served.5 4
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Jasen stressed the state's role of
parens patriae and the established policy of affording child welfare priority over commercial interests. 5 Judge Jasen noted that
the right of infants to disaffirm contractual responsibilities is necessary because of their inexperience and potential susceptibility to
adult coercion.5 After examining the statutory language of section
51 and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, Judge Jasen
concluded that the right to disaffirm contracts "should exist coextensively" with the statutory right of privacy.
It is submitted that sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights
Law, which predicate the use of an infant's name or picture upon
1158
51 Id.
52 Id.

N.Y.2d at 344-45, 448 N.E.2d at 110-11, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256-57.

at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
See id. at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257. The Court compared sections
50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law with section 3-105 of the General Obligations Law and
observed that sections 50 and 51 were intended to promote business stability. 58 N.Y.2d at
345-46, 448 N.E.2d at 111-12, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58; see N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 1976); GOL § 3-105 (1976).
58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
Id. at 348-49, 448 N.E.2d at 113, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge
Jasen emphasized that the state's role of parens patriae requires the state to protect the
interests of children when parents fail to do so. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen also
noted that if the lower courts had found the photographs to be obscene, the contract would
have been held void ab initio on public policy grounds, and the applicability of the infant's
power to disaffirm would not have been reached. Id. at 351 n.*, 448 N.E.2d at 114 n.*, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 260 n.* (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 348-49, 448 N.E.2d at 113, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 349, 448 N.E.2d at 114, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Although
the State had abrogated the infant's power to avoid contractual responsibilities "in those
situations in which it has determined that the damage incurred by the minor will be minimal and the cost to the contracting party or society would be great," id. at 351, 448 N.E.2d
at 114, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (Jasen, J., dissenting), Judge Jasen concluded that this design
had been expressed clearly in the resultant statutes, id. at 351-52, 448 N.E.2d at 114-15, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 260-61 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
11
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the consent of a parent or guardian, are premised upon the legislature's recognition that minors should be accorded special protection when they assume contractual responsibilities. In light of the
legislature's inclination to afford minors such protection, it seems
unlikely that the statutes were intended to impinge upon the right
of minors to disaffirm contracts as the majority concluded.5 8 Furthermore, the history surrounding the legislative enactments suggests that the privacy rights of minors were intended to be held
paramount to the business community's interest in binding minors
to contractual terms.5 9 Moreover, the possibility that an infant
may be exploited by his parent 0 supports a rule under which minors would retain some right to disaffirm contracts executed with
parental consent pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights
1
6

Law.

58See infra note 59. The Court of Appeals' inquiry into the intention of the legislature
began shortly after the enactment of sections 50 and 51. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 226-32, 85 N.E. 1097, 1098-1100 (1908), affl'd, 220 U.S. 502
(1911). While all cases involving these statutes recognize that sections 50 and 51 of the Civil
Rights Laws created a right that did not exist at common law, only in the Shields decision
has the Court of Appeals found those statutes to have abrogated an existing common-law
right-infant disaffirmance. See 58 N.Y.2d at 344-45, 448 N.E.2d at 110-11, 461 N.Y.S.2d at
256-57.
'1 See supra note 33. The appellate division has stated that the primary goal of the
legislature in enacting sections 50 and 51 was to prevent the use of a person's name or
portrait for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade. See Humiston v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 472, 178 N.Y.S. 752, 756 (1st Dep't 1919).
The New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of sections 50 and 51 in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223,
85 N.E. 1097 (1908), aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911). The Court of Appeals noted:
The power of the legislature in the absence of any constitutional restriction to
declare that a particular act shall constitute a crime or be actionable as a tort
cannot be questioned, where the right established or recognized and sought to be
protected is based upon an ethical sanction. Such is the character of the right of
privacy preserved by legislation protecting persons against the unauthorized use
of their names or portraits in the form of advertisements or trade notices. It is a
recognition by the law-making power of the very general sentiment which prevailed throughout the community against permitting advertisers to promote the
sale of their wares by this method, regardless of the wishes of the persons thereby
affected. There was a natural and widespread feeling that such use of their names
and portraits in the absence of consent was indefensible in morals and ought to be
prevented by law. Hence the enactment of this statute.
Id. at 228, 85 N.E. at 1099.
60 See Shields v. Gross, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
61 See De Forte v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 42 Misc. 2d 721, 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d
764, 766 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964) ("rights of an infant cannot and should not be lost
through the obdurate, unreasonable and uninformed conduct and opinion of the guardian
ad litem"); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d at 15, 174 N.Y.S.2d at
589 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957) ("approval by a parent of his infant child's contract
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Clearly, the Court of Appeals' emphasis on the need for contractual stability was not totally misplaced.2 Indeed, the increased
sophistication of today's youth has eroded part of the reasoning
underlying the doctrine of infant disaffirmance6e It is therefore
suggested that allowing a minor a qualified right to disaffirm in
those instances in which a palpable injury can be demonstrated
would represent a more equitable balance between the two conflicting interests. If, however, as in the Shields case, no such harm
is sustained,6 4 a minor should not be able to avail himself of a con[of release] does not validate it"), modified on other grounds, 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177
N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1958), modified, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1959).
a2 See Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 250-51, 188 N.E. 726, 728
(1934); Goldfinger v. Doherty, 153 Misc. 826, 830-31, 276 N.Y.S. 289, 295-96 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1934) (Lydon, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 244 App. Div. 779, 280 N.Y.S. 778 (1st
Dep't 1935).
Although the Sternlieb decision upheld an infant's right of disaffirmance, Judge Crane,
writing for a unanimous Court, described the issue as a "troublesome question arising from
the repudiation by a young gentleman, just under twenty-one, of his contract of purchase."
263 N.Y. at 246, 188 N.E. at 726. Judge Crane noted that as long as infants possess the
power to disaffirm, merchants will be forced to contract with minors "at their peril." Id. at
251, 188 N.E. at 728. In conclusion, however, Judge Crane resigned himself to the fact that
"the law is as it is, and the duty of this court is to give force and effect to the decisions as
we find them." Id.
In Goldfinger, Judge Lydon, writing in dissent, expressed dissatisfaction because under
the majority's decision a businessman has no recourse against the rescinding infant, nor is
the minor's representative liable if his agency is not also disaffirmed. 153 Misc. at 830, 276
N.Y.S. at 295 (Lydon, J., dissenting). Judge Lydon espoused the belief that "[s]ubstantial
rights of third persons ought not to be made to depend on the caprice of the infant." Id. at
830-31, 276 N.Y.S. at 295 (Lydon, J., dissenting).
'3 The need for reform in the area of infant rescissionary power has been voiced in
many quarters. See, e.g., Edge, supra note 36, at 227 (study of modern contract law shows
that protection of infants from "cunning adults" is, in reality, "misplaced zeal"); Mehler,
Infant ContractualResponsibility: A Time for Reappraisaland Realistic Adjustment?, 11
U. KAN. L. REV. 361, 373 (1963) (today's young people have a higher level of maturity and
no need for the "ancient timeworn cloak of protection"); Navin, The Contracts of Minors
Viewed From the Perspective of Fair Exchange, 50 N.C.L. REV. 517, 518-19 (1972) (the
resulting injustice of infant disaffirmance to the business community would be ameliorated
if this policy were construed as a disability similar to mental incapacity); Note, Infant Disaffirmance, supra note 36, at 98 (disaffirmance is in contravention of a fundamental societal
interest: the development of a responsible citizenry); Recent Decisions, Contracts: Infant's
Disaffirmance; Infant's Right to Void, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 437, 442-43 (1969) (businessmen
faced with doctrine of infant disafirmance will simply terminate contractual relations with
minors altogether). See generally, R. FAsON, BIRTHRIGHTS 166-69 (1974) ("protective legislation" relegates children to an inferior position in society); F. ZIMRiNG, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 17-18 (1982) (children are more mature at a younger age in
today's world).
04 In determining the type of injury that would justify the avoidance of a minor's contractual responsibilities, it should be considered that the objective of section 51 is to "[pro-
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tractual disability to circumvent valid business agreements. To be
sure, such a solution would adequately safeguard the businessman's interests while guaranteeing minors the right to control their
own exposure to commercial exploitation so that a child will not be
left to the caprice of his guardian in the labyrinth of privacy law in
New York. 5
Bernard W. Hylan

COURT OF CLAIMS

ACT

Ct. Cl. Act § 8: In the absence of a special relationshipimposing
a duty of care upon the municipality to a particularplaintiff, the
tect] a person's feelings and right to be let alone." Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F.
Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted); see N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976). It is submitted that a celebrity such as Shields, who has affirmatively sought
public recognition, would not have been able to demonstrate injury in the present situation.
Thus, it is suggested that the right of disaffirmance would not have been available to her
had a qualified right of disaffirmance been adopted by the Court. Indeed, in Shields v.
Gross, 563 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case brought by the same plaintiff subsequent
to the Court of Appeals' decision, Shields sought a preliminary injunction in federal court to
restrain the defendant from publishing the same nude prints. Id. at 1253. In refusing to
issue an injunction, Judge Leval held that "[p]laintiff's claim of harm is. . .underinined to
a substantial extent by the development of her career projecting a sexually provocative image." Id. at 1257. The court also noted that the plaintiff's strategy of filing consecutive
claims rather than concurrent suits was inequitable to the defendant who had already been
restrained for over 2 years during the pendency of the state action. Id. at 1255.
65 See Recent Decisions, Civil Rights Law-Invasion of Privacy-Use of Photograph-Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 35 ALB. L. REv. 790, 798 (1971) (describing the
difficulties of separating privacy rights of the individual from the public's right to a free flow
of information as a "quagmire"). Compare Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp.
1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (celebrity musicians garner no protection from section 51 since
their "likenesses" are in the public domain) and Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc.,
498 F. Supp. 401, 404-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (famous actress cannot control faithful reproduction of scene from public performance) with Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 App. Div. 2d 428,
440-42, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012-13 (1st Dep't 1981) (poster photograph taken during cable
television taping requires model's written consent for publication). The dearth of any logical
development or systematic approach to the right of privacy in New York has been described
as "'still that of a haystack in a hurricane.' "Brinkley, 80 App. Div. 2d at 436, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 1010 (quoting Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956)). It is submitted that in the resulting morass that is contemporary privacy law in this state, the infant-plaintiff's heretofore unquestioned right of
disaffirmance has been lost. See generally Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH.
L. REV. 777, 777-78 (1980) (analysis of lack of clarity in development of constitutional right
of privacy); Comment, Privacy Tort Law in New York: Some Existing Routes to Recovery,
31 BUFFALO L. REv. 255, 256 (1982) (study of the confusion in New York privacy law).

